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Abstract
What makes some risks dreadful? We propose that people are particularly sensitive to threats that could kill the number of
people that is similar to the size of a typical human social circle. Although there is some variability in reported sizes of social
circles, active contact rarely seems to be maintained with more than about 100 people. The loss of this immediate social
group may have had survival consequences in the past and still causes great distress to people today. Therefore we
hypothesize that risks that threaten a much larger number of people (e.g., 1000) will not be dreaded more than those that
threaten to kill ‘‘only’’ the number of people typical for social circles. We found support for this hypothesis in 9 experiments
using different risk scenarios, measurements of fear, and samples from different countries. Fear of risks killing 100 people
was higher than fear of risks killing 10 people, but there was no difference in fear of risks killing 100 or 1000 people
(Experiments 1–4, 7–9). Also in support of the hypothesis, the median number of deaths that would cause maximum level of
fear was 100 (Experiments 5 and 6). These results are not a consequence of lack of differentiation between the numbers 100
and 1000 (Experiments 7 and 8), and are different from the phenomenon of ‘‘psychophysical numbing’’ that occurs in the
context of altruistic behavior towards members of other communities rather than in the context of threat to one’s own
community (Experiment 9). We discuss several possible explanations of these findings. Our results stress the importance of
considering social environments when studying people’s understanding of and reactions to risks.
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Introduction
It is common for people to dread some risks but not others:
They tend to be very afraid of epidemic diseases, nuclear power
plant failures, and plane accidents but are relatively unconcerned
about some highly frequent and deadly events, such as traffic
crashes, household accidents, and medical errors. One key
distinction of dreadful risks seems to be their potential for
catastrophic consequences [1], threatening to kill a large number
of people within a short period of time [2]. In this paper, we
propose that people may be particularly sensitive to risks that
could wipe out the number of people that corresponds to the size
of a typical social circle–family, friends, colleagues, and others that
people interact with on a regular basis [3,4].
What is the size of a typical social circle? In hunter-gatherer
societies–typical for most of human evolutionary history–people
frequently lived in bands of 20 to 50 individuals [5,6]. Several
adjacent bands often maintained regular contact for collaborative
activities or ceremonial purposes, creating a local community of
about 100 to 200 individuals [7]. In modern societies, the same
groupings appear in personal and professional social networks [8].
For example, in a recent study of a Dutch population (Galesic,
Olsson, Rieskamp, in preparation), participants maintained
regular face-to-face contact with a median of 50 individuals
(interquartile range: 20–100 people). The number of individuals
with whom people are in regular–but not necessarily face-to-face–
contact is somewhat higher: Participants in a study in the United
Kingdom sent Christmas cards to a median of 138 people
(interquartile range: 88–213 people) [9]. Similarly, the average
number of contacts that people have at a large social networking
site is 130 [10]. Larger social circles are relatively rare, possibly
because humans have a cognitive limit allowing them to maintain
stable relationships with at most 150 individuals [8]. In sum,
although there is a large variability in reported sizes of social
circles, active contact seems to be rarely maintained with more
than 100 to 200 people.
Why would people be especially afraid of risks that could kill
roughly the number of people that corresponds to the size of a
typical social circle? One possibility is that the fear developed in
our evolutionary history. Given the very low population densities
throughout most of the Paleolithic–about 1 person per 10 square
miles [11]–losing one’s community might have implied being
alone for days or longer before encountering another group. This
would have been a serious threat to one’s fitness, as being in a
group reduces predation risk, helps with finding food and hunting,
and increases survival chances when injured [12–15]. People who
were more afraid of risks that could kill their whole group might
have been more likely to engage in behaviors that helped the
group to escape or reduce the impact of the dreaded risk (e.g.,
avoiding contaminants that could lead to an epidemic infection,
urging the group to evacuate a dangerous area, trying to prevent
the risk, or helping others who were affected), thus saving their
group and with it increasing their own fitness. Therefore, although
today population densities are many times higher than in the
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away, people may still have a tendency to be particularly sensitive
to risks that could destroy a typical social circle.
If it is true that people dread risks that threaten to kill roughly
the number of people that corresponds to the size of a typical
social circle, then risks that threaten a much larger number of
people should not be dreaded more. To investigate this idea, we
conducted a series of 9 experiments. In Experiments 1 to 4, we
tested a very specific hypothesis: Risks that kill 100 people would
be feared more than those that kill 10 people, but risks that kill 1000
people would not be feared more than the risks that kill 100 people.
That is, we expected this pattern of results rather than a
monotonic increase of fear with increase in group size. The
rationale is that (a) risks that kill 10 people are insufficient to wipe
out everyone in a typical social circle and, therefore, will cause
moderate fear, (b) risks that kill 100 people suffice to eliminate
most of a typical social circle and hence will produce more fear
than risks that kills 10 people, and (c) risks that kill 1000 people
cannot cause much additional damage to one’s social circle than
those that kill 100 people and hence will not be feared more. In
Experiments 5 and 6, we used a different methodology to directly
test the hypothesis that dread peaks when a risk threatens to kill
the number of people that corresponds to the size of a typical
social circle. In Experiments 7 and 8, we ruled out an alternative
explanation of the results. Finally, in Experiment 9, we show that
this pattern of results is not the same as the ‘‘psychophysical
numbing’’ phenomenon.
Experiments 1–4
Method
Ethics statement. All experiments in this paper were
approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of
Granada. Participants had to confirm that they have read and
agreed to a written paper-based (Experiments 1 and 7) or
electronic (other experiments) informed consent form before
starting the study. Three participants in Experiment 2 and one
in Experiment 8 reported to be 17 years old and they were
excluded from the analysis.
Participants. Experiment 1 was conducted in January 2009
with n=83 undergraduates (25% men, age 18–37 years) in the lab
at the University of Granada in Spain. Experiment 2 was
conducted in February 2009 with n=44 participants (30% men;
age 18–63 years), recruited via two Web sites that linked to
psychological experiments (http://psych.hanover.edu/Research/
exponnet.html and http://genpsylab-wexlist.unizh.ch/). Two
thirds [29] of the participants in Experiment 2 were from the
United States while a third lived in other countries (U.K.,
Germany, Australia, or others). Participants in Experiments 3
(n=30, 50% men, age 18–69 years) and 4 (n=30, 35% men, age
22–67 years) were recruited via the Web marketplace Amazon
Mechanical Turk, which provides a convenient pool for
conducting some types of behavioral research [16]; all participants
reported being from the United States. Experiments 3 and 4 were
conducted in February 2011.
Materials and Procedure. In Experiments 1 to 4,
participants read a brief description of a scenario involving risks
that threaten to kill a specific number of people. In Experiment 1
and 2, the risk was described as ‘‘an unknown, deadly disease
affecting your town.’’ In Experiment 3, the risk was described as
‘‘an accident in a factory near your town, resulting in a release of
poisonous fumes into the air.’’ Finally, in Experiment 4, the risk
was described as ‘‘an earthquake that struck a part of your town.’’
In each experiment, randomly chosen groups of participants were
told that the risk was forecasted to kill 10, 100, or 1000 people in
their town within a week. Participants were then asked to rate how
much they would be afraid of that risk on an 11-point scale
ranging from 0 (‘‘not at all’’) to 10 (‘‘very much’’). As a control, we
further asked participants to estimate the size of the town they
lived in at that time and to report their age and sex.
Results
In line with our hypothesis, in all four experiments there was a
significant increase in fear of risks killing 10 vs. 100 people, but no
significant difference in fear of risks killing 100 vs. 1000 people (see
Figure 1). For example, in Experiment 1 the mean difference
(6SE) in ratings of fear of a disease killing 10 and 100 people was
1.460.55, d=0.64, whereas there was a difference of
20.0460.54, d=0.03, in ratings of fear of diseases killing 100
and 1000 people. In Experiment 3, the mean difference in ratings
of fear of factory accidents killing 10 and 100 people as a result of
the release of poisonous fumes into the air was 1.661.11, d=0.71,
whereas there was a difference of 0.1361.02, d=0.06, in ratings of
fear of factory accidents killing 100 and 1000 people. Similar
results were obtained in Experiments 2 and 4 (Figure 1). There
were no significant interactions of the number of deaths and sex,
age, or town size of the participants. There was a tendency for
women to give higher ratings of fear than men, but it did not
interact with the pattern of results reported above.
Experiments 5 and 6
To test if the results in Experiments 1 through 4 are partially
due to some methodological artifact (e.g. scale-end effects that
deflate high ratings [17]), in Experiments 5 and 6 we employed a
different method. In particular, we asked participants to estimate
the number of deaths that would make them feel different levels of
fear in the scenarios used in the previous experiments (i.e., disease,
factory accident, and earthquake). In addition, in Experiment 6 we
asked participants to estimate the number of individuals in their
social circle to test if our assumption about the size of a typical
social circle is correct. If dread is indeed related to the risk of a
typical social circle being wiped out, then, on the group level, the
average number of deaths needed to feel the maximum fear should
correspond to the size of a typical social circle. In addition,
Figure 1. Ratings of fear of risk killing 10, 100, or 1000 people,
obtained in Experiments 1–4. Error bars represent 61 standard
error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032837.g001
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Method
Participants. Participants in Experiments 5 (n=92, 44%
men, age 20–64 years) and 6 (n=86, 45% men, age 18–72 years)
were recruited via the Web marketplace Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Experiment 5 was conducted in February 2011 and
Experiment 6 in March 2011. All participants reported to be
from the United States.
Materials and Procedure. Participants estimated the
number of deaths that would need to occur in order for them to
feel five different levels of fear ranging from ‘‘not at all afraid’’ to
‘‘very afraid.’’ Random subgroups of participants were asked to
imagine different risk scenarios, all already used in Experiments 1
to 4: disease, factory accident, and earthquake. In addition,
participants in Experiment 6 were asked to estimate the size of
their social circle using the summation method [18]. In this method,
participants report the size of different groups within their social
circle, defined as the number of ‘‘people you encounter and
interact with regularly, or are otherwise important to you even if
you don’t meet them very often’’. The total number of individuals
reported is taken as an estimate of the size of their social circle.
The groups were: immediate family, other close family, distant
relatives one is in contact with, other people one is in regular
contact with, and other people who one feels are important to
him/her. Participants wrote the number of individuals belonging
to each group in an open text field. A random half of the
participants were asked about their social circle before the
questions about fear, and the other half after.
Note that measuring the size of social circles, or more broadly,
the size of personal social networks, is a difficult methodological
problem. The way a social network is defined, the questions used
to ask about its size, and the ability of participants to recall their
social contacts might influence the results [19]. The summation
method [18] is based on the assumption that people’s memories
about other people are organized according to the social structure
of their community and that using some common elements of
social structure as prompts will improve recall [20]. Although the
estimates are likely to be noisy because of various sources of error
(e.g., forgetting, counting some individuals more than once), they
concur with results of other methods and are reasonable proxies of
the size of participants’ social circles [18].
Results
Figure 2 shows the range of participants’ estimates for the
number of deaths that would cause different levels of fear, as
obtained in Experiment 6. The results of Experiment 5 were very
similar. Median number of deaths required for fear levels 1 to 5
were in Experiment 5 (Experiment 6): 1 (1), 5 (5), 15 (10), 50 (25),
and 100 (100). Even though the range of estimates was large, for
the majority of participants the number of deaths that made them
maximally scared was not larger than 500.
For comparison, Figure 2 shows the average social circle size of
the participants. Median size of the social circle was 77 individuals.
Most (95%) participants had social circles smaller than 200
individuals. These results correspond to the indicators we gathered
from the previous studies
1 [8–10], suggesting that the number of
active contacts rarely exceeds 100 to 200 individuals. In sum, our
hypothesis that dread reaches peak for risks that can kill all
individuals in a typical social circle has been confirmed on the
group level.
At the individual level, our results suggest that participants
might have used the size of their own social circle to estimate the
number of deaths needed to evoke the highest level of fear. The
estimated number of deaths needed for the maximum fear was not
significantly different from the number of individuals in partici-
pants’ social circle (in sign test, Z=0.22, n=86, P=0.83).
Participants whose social circles were smaller than the median
required fewer deaths for the maximum level of fear than those
whose social circles were equal to or above the median size:
Mdn=40 vs. 150 deaths, respectively (in median test, x
2=4.78,
df=1,P=0.03). On the other hand, the correlation between the
size of individual social circles and the number of deaths that elicit
most fear was small and not statistically significant (rho=0.11,
P=0.30). Taken together, these results suggest that the size of own
social circle affects one’s estimate of the most dreaded death toll,
but it is likely to be only one of several factors that affect the results
at the individual level. We comment on this issue in the
Discussion.
Neither the estimates of number of deaths nor those of social
circle sizes were affected by participants’ sex or size of the town
where they lived, risk scenario, or whether the question about fear
was asked before or after the question about social circle
(Experiment 6). Although women and participants from smaller
towns tended to require fewer deaths for maximum level of fear,
this tendency was not reliably present.
Experiments 7 and 8
An alternative explanation of the results obtained so far might
have been that people do not perceive much difference between
the numbers 100 and 1000. In Experiments 7 and 8, we tested this
using both a context-free evaluation of numbers and a monetary
loss scenario.
Method
Participants. In Experiment 7, participants were 138
students at the University of Granada in Spain (18% men, age
18–36 years). Experiment 8 was conducted with n=254
participants (43% men, age 18–72 years) recruited from
Sozioland–a large online panel of German Internet users.
Experiments 7 and 8 were conducted in April and May 2009,
respectively.
Materials and Procedure. As in Experiments 1 and 2,
randomly selected groups of participants in Experiment 7 were
asked to rate their fear of diseases killing 10, 100, or 1000 people.
After approximately 15 min of answering unrelated questions [21]
randomly selected groups of participants were asked to simply rate
the size of the numbers 10, 100, or 1000 without any context,
using a 21-point scale ranging from 0 (‘‘very small’’) to 21 (‘‘very
large;’’ in the analysis we rescaled it to 11 points). In this latter
context-free number size task, participants were assigned to 10,
100, or 1000 condition independently of the number they received
in the former, fear of disease task. In Experiment 8, one third of
participants received the fear of disease task used in Experiment 7,
another third received the context-free number size task and rated
the numbers using an 11-point scale, and the last third rated how
upset they would feel if they lost 10, 100, or 1000 euros on an 11-
point scale ranging from 0 (‘‘not at all’’) to 10 (‘‘very much’’).
Within each of the thirds, randomly selected groups of participants
were assigned to 10, 100, or 1000 condition.
Results
In accord with our hypothesis and with previous results,
participants’ fear of a disease killing 100 people was larger than the
fear of the same disease killing 10 people but was similar to the fear
of the disease killing 1000 people (Figure 3). These results emerged
Dread Risks
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difference in ratings of fear of a disease killing 10 and 100 people
was 1.260.32, d=0.51, and 1.860.85, d=0.73, in Experiments 7
and 8, respectively, whereas the mean difference in ratings of fear
of a disease killing 100 and 1000 people was 20.360.32, d=0.15,
and 0.1560.72, d=0.07, in Experiments 7 and 8, respectively.
In contrast to the results about fear of a disease, both the
evaluated size of context-free numbers and the distress with
monetary losses increased from 100 to 1000. The mean difference
in ratings for context-free numbers 100 and 1000 was 2.060.90,
d=0.48, in Experiment 7, and 1.660.64, d=0.89, in Experiment
8. The mean difference in ratings for being upset after losing 100
or 1000 euros was 1.360.64, d=0.70, in Experiment 8. Taken
together, these results suggest that (1) the patterns of fear ratings
observed so far are not due to a general insensitivity to the
difference between the numbers 100 and 1000, and (2) the effect is
specific for scenarios involving people’s lives rather than monetary
losses or plain numbers.
Experiment 9
On the surface, the patterns of fear found in our experiments
appear to be similar to the results of studies on ‘‘psychophysical
numbing’’ [22–26]. These studies have found that people’s
willingness to contribute to charitable causes decreases with the
increasing number of people suffering. This phenomenon is
thought to be a consequence of diminishing sensitivity to changes
in number of deaths as the overall number of deaths becomes
larger–similar to psychophysical relations observed for other
physical quantities such as loudness and brightness [22]. In the
present paper, we propose that the mechanism behind feelings of
dread is different from psychophysical numbing. In particular,
while psychophysical numbing occurs in altruistic behavior toward
unfortunate people from other communities (e.g., refugees in
Rwanda [22] or children in Africa [26]), the patterns in feelings of
dread that we investigate originate from a potential threat to one’s
own community. Because the extinction of one’s own community–
but not that of others–may threaten one’s own survival, the specific
form of the relationship between fear and the size of a threatened
group can be expected only for people’s own communities and not
for that of others. In other words, when members of people’s own
community are threatened, fear should increase for risks killing 10
people to those killing 100 people, and then stay approximately the
Figure 2. Number of deaths needed to experience different levels of fear, obtained in Experiment 6. The first five boxes show number of
deaths needed to experience levels of fear from 1–5. The last box shows size of participants’ social circles. Boxes represent interquartile range of
estimates. Horizontal line within the boxes is the median. Whiskers cover observations that are one interquartile range away from the first and the
third quartile. Crosses represent extreme outliers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032837.g002
Figure 3. Ratings of numbers 10, 100, and 1000, in different
contexts, obtained in Experiment 8. Error bars represent 61
standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032837.g003
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threatened, fear should be on a relatively low level independently
of the number of people at risk. In Experiment 9, we tested this
hypothesis.
Method
Participants. Ninety members of the online panel
maintained by the Max Planck Institute for Human
Development in Berlin, Germany participated in the study in
June 2010. All participants were undergraduate students of local
universities; 42% were men, with an age range of 21–36 years and
an average age of 27 years.
Materials and Procedure. We used the disease scenario of
Experiments 1, 2, 7, and 8. As in these experiments, the size of the
affected group (10, 100, or 1000) was manipulated between
subjects. In addition, there was a within-subject manipulation of
the community affected by the disease. Each participant received
three scenarios involving one group size in three different
communities: Germans in Germany (i.e., participants’ home
country), Egyptians in Egypt (i.e., a country similar in
population size but different in many other aspects; cf. Central
Intelligence Agency, 2010), and German tourists currently in
Egypt. The order of communities was counterbalanced. After a
brief introduction, the participants read the following text:
‘‘Imagine that [Germany/Egypt/German tourists currently in
Egypt] [is/are] affected by an unknown, deadly disease. Health
authorities forecast that the disease will kill [10/100/1000] [people
in Germany/people in Egypt/German tourists currently in Egypt]
within the next week.’’ For each community, participants rated
how afraid they would be of the disease on a scale ranging from 0
(‘‘not at all’’) to 10 (‘‘very much’’). Finally, to check the success of
the community manipulation, participants rated for each
community the extent of (a) empathy and (b) moral
responsibility they felt toward the people affected by the disease,
as well as (c) how similar they considered themselves to be to the
people in the particular community, all on the same 11-point scale
used for the fear assessments.
Results
Manipulation checks. The type of community significantly
affected participants’ ratings of perceived similarity: Our
participants rated themselves as most similar to people living in
Germany (Mean6SE=5.160.16), followed by German tourists in
Egypt (3.760.15), and finally by people living in Egypt (3.360.16).
In a repeated measures analysis of variance, all three communities
were significantly different from each other (for difference between
German tourists and people living in Egypt, F1,89=7.88,
P=0.006). The patterns for empathy and moral obligation were
similar: Participants reported higher levels of empathy and moral
obligation for people in Germany (5.560.15 and 4.260.16,
respectively) than for either German tourists (5.260.15 and
3.760.16, respectively) or people living in Egypt (5.260.15 and
3.660.17, respectively). Because of a substantial level of variation
of these ratings between participants, in the analyses that follow we
include all three variables as controls.
Fear ratings. Fear was significantly stronger when scenarios
involved either people living in Germany (Mean6SE=5.66.32)
or German tourists (5.06.30) than when they involved people
living in Egypt (3.56.27). As Figure 4 shows, when scenarios
involved people in their own community (i.e., people living in
Germany), fear ratings followed the same trend we found in
previous experiments: There was a significant increase in fear of
risks killing 10 vs. 100 people (Mean difference6SE=1.460.70,
d=0.53), but no difference in fear of risks killing 100 vs. 1000
people (20.360.69, d=0.09). In contrast, for people in other
communities (i.e., German tourists in Egypt and people living in
Egypt) there were no significant differences in fear for different
numbers of affected individuals. These results support our
argument that the dread pattern we observed is specific for
people’s own community and is different from psychophysical
numbing, which occurs for more distant communities [22]. While
death of 100 people in one’s own community is dreaded more than
death of 10 people, in distant communities death of 10, 100, and
1000 people provoked similar, and relatively low levels of fear.
Discussion
In nine experiments, we found support for the hypothesis that
people dread risks that threaten to wipe out the number of people
corresponding to the size of a typical social circle. This pattern of
fear appears consistently for several types of risk, including deadly
diseases, earthquakes, and factory accidents resulting in a release
of poisonous fumes into the air–suggesting that the underlying
mechanism is not a specific adaptation to any particular risk (e.g.,
the risk of getting infected by an epidemic disease) but a more
general concern about the possibility of losing one’s social circle.
We hypothesized that this relationship of dread and size of
typical social circle has an evolutionary origin: loosing one’s group
might have been deadly in ancient human history. As the extant
literature [5–11] and our own data suggest that people tend to
maintain active contact with no more than 100–150 people, threat
to this number of people would be expected to evoke maximum
dread. Our results are in accord with this hypothesis.
It is important to acknowledge other mechanisms that could
have contributed to this pattern of results. For instance, because
people seem to be cognitively adapted to maintain social contact
with not more than 100–150 people [8], this group size may come
to mind most naturally when trying to imagine a large group. In a
related vein, people may have difficulty grasping the meaning of
groups of people larger than about 100 people, as they may rarely
encounter so many people in their everyday life. However,
modern life seems to offer plenty of opportunities to encounter
large numbers of people–from busy streets and public transpor-
tation, to sport and public events, to news about number of people
using different products or being affected by war or disease.
Figure 4. Ratings of fear killing people in different communi-
ties, obtained in Experiment 9. Error bars represent 61 standard
error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032837.g004
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probably not very difficult in the present times.
Another possibility is that participants imagined their own social
circle being wiped off, and therefore their expressed dread could
have been a by-product of feelings of emotional attachment to its
members [27,28], rather than a product of an evolutionary
adaptation to survival threats related to being alone. If this was the
case, we would expect a strong correlation between the size of own
social circle and the number of deaths that elicit maximum fear.
However, the results of Experiment 6 suggest that the size of own
social circle is only weakly related to the estimates of most dreaded
death tolls, and that a general knowledge of the size of a typical
social circle might be more important. This is supported by the
fact that in our experiments feelings of dread were not reliably
related to the size of participants’ town, even though participants
in smaller towns technically have higher chance to lose their social
circles than participants in larger towns affected by the same risk.
The patterns of fear found in our experiments may appear to be
similar to the phenomenon of psychophysical numbing [22–26].
However, while psychophysical numbing occurs in the context of
other communities, the dread risk investigated in this study
concerns threats that can plausibly affect people’s own community.
Indeed, in our last experiment, we found the characteristic pattern
of fear ratings only for the participants’ own community–in
particular for compatriots currently living in the same location as
the participant. As expected, fear did not change with different
number of victims in an unrelated community. These results do
not invalidate the phenomenon of psychophysical numbing, but
suggest that it is different from the phenomenon we describe in this
paper.
Regardless of whether the origin of dread is phylogenetic or
ontogenetic, our results highlight the importance of people’s social
environments for the way they interpret and react to risks. The
role of social circles in the understanding of risks has already been
emphasized by Hertwig, Pachur, and their colleagues [3,4] who
showed that people use their social circles to make judgments
about frequencies of health risks in the general population. In a
similar vein, Olivola and Sagara [18] proposed that people’s
preferences for risky solutions in problems involving human
fatalities are guided by the distributions of death tolls in their
environment. Specifically, in environments where high death tolls
are relatively rare, subjective distance between events causing
intermediate number of deaths (e.g. 20 and 40) is expected to be
smaller. Hence, people in these environments will be more likely to
prefer risk-seeking (e.g. 50% probability that nobody will die and
50% probability that 40 will die) to risk-averse (e.g. 20 people will
die) solutions to potentially deathly threats. The authors’ results
confirm this hypothesis: U.S. and Japanese participants, who
according to the statistics rarely experience catastrophes involving
large death tolls, prefer risky solutions more than Indian and
Indonesian participants who experience large death tolls more
often. Our findings cannot be directly compared to those of
Olivola and Sagara [18] because we focus on emotional reaction
to risks while they examined the effect of environmental
distribution of death tolls on the curvature of individual utility
functions and consequently their risk-seeking preferences. Given
that it has been documented that emotion of fear affects risky
choice [30], it is possible that both, fear of loosing one’s
community and statistical distributions of death tolls, contributed
to both the present results and those of Olivola and Sagara.
Further experiments could try to investigate the relative contribu-
tion of different mechanisms to the patterns we identified.
Our findings are in line with the studies conducted by Wang
and his collaborators [31,32], who showed that framing effects in
risky choices involving human groups occur only when problems
are presented in the context of large (e.g., with 600 or 6000 people)
but not small (e.g., 6 or 60 people) group sizes, ‘‘suggesting a ‘live
or die together’ small group rationality’’ [33]. That smaller groups
have a special status when it comes to estimating risks is also
echoed by Garcia-Retamero and Galesic’s [34,35] findings that
medical risks are easier to understand and recall if they are
presented on the basis of smaller, evolutionarily plausible groups of
people.
We can exclude several possible methodological confounds of
our findings. First, the results are not a consequence of a particular
sample structure: We have replicated the basic patterns in different
countries, with different demographic groups, and using different
methodologies (i.e. laboratory and web-based experiments).
Second, we believe that the results cannot be attributed to some
side effect of the between-subjects design. In fact, as Birnbaum
[36] showed, a more typical finding in between-subjects designs is
a lack of differentiation between different numbers, or even results
that violate mathematical laws (e.g., 9.221). Third, this pattern of
results does not appear to be a consequence of a ceiling effect: In
none of the experiments was the average fear rating of a risk that
strikes 100 people larger than 8 on a scale of 0 to 10, leaving
enough room for further increase. In fact, the annoyance caused
by monetary losses, measured in Experiment 8, grew monoton-
ically with the increase in monetary amounts even though it was
close to the upper part of the scale from the start (see Figure 3). In
addition, the pattern of results appears to be specific to scenarios
involving people’s lives. Evaluations of context-free numbers
(Experiments 7 and 8) and monetary losses (Experiment 8) show
the expected monotonic increase with the size of number.
The present results have implications for communicating risks to
the general public. When the goal is to raise public awareness
about a certain risk that could claim 100 or more lives, it would be
beneficial to stress that the risk could kill this or larger number of
people. More broadly, our results stress the importance of
considering social environments when studying people’s under-
standing of and reactions to risks.
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